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HACKTIVISM: A NEW BREED OF PROTEST 
IN A NETWORKED WORLD 
Noah C.N. Hampson* 
Abstract: After WikiLeaks released hundreds of thousands of classified 
U.S. government documents in 2010, the ensuing cyber-attacks waged by 
all sides in the controversy brought the phenomenon of hacktivism into 
popular focus. Many forms of hacktivism exploit illegal access to networks 
for financial gain, and cause expensive damage. Other forms are used 
primarily to advocate for political or social change. Applicable law in most 
developed countries, including the United States and the United King-
dom, generally prohibits hacktivism. However, these countries also protect 
the right to protest as an essential element of free speech. This Note ar-
gues that forms of hacktivism that are primarily expressive, that do not 
cause serious damage, and that do not exploit illegal access to networks or 
computers, sufficiently resemble traditional forms of protest to warrant 
protection from the application of anti-hacking laws under widely accepted 
principles of free speech. 
Introduction 
 Early on the morning of November 30, 2010, WikiLeaks.org came 
under assault by a hacker known as “th3j35t3r” (The Jester).1 By launch-
ing what is known as a denial of service (DoS) attack with software of his 
own invention, The Jester overwhelmed WikiLeaks’ servers with re-
quests for information.2 WikiLeaks.org soon crashed, and remained 
down for more than twenty-four hours.3 Days before, WikiLeaks made 
international headlines by posting on its website roughly 250,000 classi-
fied documents stolen from the U.S. government.4 On his Twitter feed, 
The Jester claimed credit: “www.wikileaks.org—TANGO DOWN—for 
                                                                                                                      
* Noah C.N. Hampson is the Editor in Chief of the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. He would like to thank Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea, John Gordon, 
Lauren Campbell, and Megan Felter for their invaluable advice, assistance, and support. 
1 Sean-Paul Correll, ’Tis the Season of DDoS–WikiLeaks Edition, PandaLabs Blog (Dec. 4, 
2010) [hereinafter Correll, ’Tis the Season], http://pandalabs.pandasecurity.com/tis-the-
season-of-ddos-wikileaks-editio/. 
2 See Neil J. Rubenkind, WikiLeaks Attack: Not the First by th3j35t3r, PCMag.com (Nov. 
29, 2010), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2373559,00.asp. 
3 See Correll, ’Tis the Season, supra note 1. 
4 See Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 2010, at A1. 
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attempting to endanger the lives of our troops, ‘other assets’ & foreign 
relations #wikileaks #fail.”5 
  To get its website back online, WikiLeaks promptly switched 
hosting providers and began renting bandwidth from Amazon.com.6 
DoS and other attacks against WikiLeaks continued, but were unsuc-
cessful.7 Shortly thereafter, however, Amazon ousted WikiLeaks from its 
servers after Senator Joseph Lieberman contacted Amazon “for an ex-
planation” of its decision to provide hosting services to the whistle-
blower site.8 WikiLeaks then moved to another hosting service, but 
again was cut off by the service provider after ongoing DoS attacks 
threatened the stability of every other website hosted by the provider.9 
Finally, after establishing a number of mirror sites (thereby multiplying 
the number of sites on which its content appeared), the WikiLeaks 
website was once again stable.10 
 The controversy surrounding WikiLeaks, however, was only begin-
ning. Soon, major companies that provided services to WikiLeaks and 
its users began withdrawing support.11 Citing violations of its Accept-
able Use Policy, PayPal cancelled WikiLeaks’ account, preventing 
WikiLeaks from receiving donations through the popular online pay-
ment service.12 Three days later, MasterCard suspended cardholder 
                                                                                                                      
5 See Lee, Wikileaks and th3j35t3r—Has He Made the Right Call?, Security FAQs Blog 
(Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.security-faqs.com/wikileaks-and-th3j35t3r-has-he-made-the-right-
call.html. 
6 See Anahad O’Connor, Amazon Removes WikiLeaks from Servers, N.Y. Times (Dec. 2, 
2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/world/02amazon.html?scp=1&sq 
=wikileaks & Amazon&st=cse. 
7 See Charlie Savage, Amazon Cites Terms of Use in Expulsion of WikiLeaks, N.Y. Times, Dec. 
2, 2010, at A10. 
8 See Steve Ragan, Recap: WikiLeaks Faces More Heat in the Wake of Cablegate, Tech Herald 
(Dec. 4, 2010), http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/201048/6505/Recap-WikiLeaks-
faces-more-heat-in-the-wake-of-cablegate; Press Release, Sen. Joseph Lieberman, Internet 
Company Had Hosted WikiLeaks Website (Dec. 1, 2010), available at http://lieberman.sen 
ate.gov/index.cfm/news-events/news/2010/12/amazon-severs-ties-with-wikileaks. But see Aus-
tin Carr, Why Lieberman Had Nothing to Do with Amazon Dropping WikiLeaks, Fast Company 
(Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.fastcompany.com/1707262/why-lieberman-had-nothing-to-do-with-
amazon-dropping-wikileaks (quoting Lieberman’s communications director, denying that the 
Senator specifically asked Amazon to remove WikiLeaks). 
9 See Taylor Barnes, Booted from U.S.-Based Domain, WikiLeaks Site Finds Refuge with Swiss 
Pirate Party, Christian Sci. Monitor (Dec. 3, 2010), available at http://www.csmonitor. 
com/World/terrorism-security/2010/1203/Booted-from-US-based-domain-WikiLeaks-site-
finds-refuge-with-Swiss-Pirate-Party. 
10 See Ragan, supra note 8 (quoting EveryDNS.net’s press release concerning Wiki- 
Leaks and providing a link to a list of WikiLeaks’ mirror sites). 
11 See id. 
12 See PayPal Statement Regarding WikiLeaks, PayPal Blog (Dec. 3, 2010), https://www. 
thepaypalblog.com/2010/12/paypal-statement-regarding-wikileaks/. 
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payments to WikiLeaks.13 The next day, Visa did the same.14 Swiss bank 
PostFinance closed the account of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, 
claiming that Assange provided false information concerning his place 
of residence.15 Bank of America, citing concerns that WikiLeaks “may 
be engaged in activities that are, among other things, inconsistent with 
our internal policies,” likewise pulled the plug, refusing to process 
payments to WikiLeaks.16 
 The uproar that accompanied these corporate announcements 
sparked an online backlash.17 An amorphous, international group of 
individuals, known as “Anonymous,” began to bombard the websites of 
entities it deemed opposed to WikiLeaks with distributed denial of ser-
vice (DDoS) attacks.18 Many of the sites crashed, and others were ren-
dered inoperable for some time.19 The group’s declared mission, called 
Operation Payback, was to raise awareness of the actions of WikiLeaks’ 
opponents, to fight what it perceived to be censorship by identifying 
and attacking those responsible for the attacks on WikiLeaks, and to 
support “those who are helping lead our world to freedom and democ-
racy.”20 
 To some, the conflict surrounding the WikiLeaks controversy was 
the first real example of a war over digital information.21 John Perry 
Barlow, co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, announced 
on Twitter that “[t]he first serious infowar is now engaged. The field of 
battle is WikiLeaks. You are the troops.”22 To others, including mem-
bers of Anonymous, Operation Payback is the most prominent recent 
example of a trend that has been developing since the invention of the 
                                                                                                                      
13 See Declan McCullagh, MasterCard Pulls Plug on WikiLeaks Payments, CNET News 
(Dec. 6, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20024776-281.html. 
14 See Visa Suspends All Payments to WikiLeaks, USA Today (Dec. 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2010-12-07-visa-wikileaks_N.htm. 
15 See Matthew Allen, Former WikiLeaks “Bank” Still Denied License, SwissInfo.ch (Dec. 
21, 2010), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/Former_WikiLeaks_bank_still_denied_ 
licence.html?cid=29080126. 
16 See Steven Musil, Bank of America Cuts Off WikiLeaks, CNET News (Dec. 18, 2010), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20026103-281.html?tag=mncol;5n. 
17 See Sean-Paul Correll, Operation: Payback Broadens to “Operation Avenge Assange,” Pan-
daLabs Blog (Dec. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Correll, Payback], http://pandalabs.pandasecu 
rity.com/operationpayback-broadens-to-operation-avenge-assange/. 
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
20 Id. 
21 See Raphael G. Satter & Peter Svensson, WikiLeaks Fights to Stay Online amid Attacks, 
BusinessWeek (Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9JSHK 
UG0.htm. 
22 Id. 
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Internet: computer savvy individuals deploying their skills online to 
protest for or against a cause—or, more simply, “hacktivism.”23 
 Like many aspects of Internet activity, hacktivism is transnational 
in scope; as a result, any effective legal response should include inter-
national coordination that draws on widely accepted democratic prin-
ciples of free speech.24 Part I of this Note describes the differences be-
tween hacking and hacktivism. In addition to investigating the threats 
posed by hackers, this section explores the desirable aspects of hacktiv-
ism. Part II discusses the existing international legal framework in the 
area of cybersecurity, in particular the Council of Europe’s Convention 
on Cybercrime. It compares the domestic regimes of criminal laws af-
fecting hacktivism in two key signatory states, the United States and the 
United Kingdom, and it considers how U.S. and UK law protect legiti-
mate protest as a form of free speech, petition, and assembly. Part III 
analyzes how certain methods of hacktivism may be compared to con-
ventional means of protest. Finally, this Note concludes that a narrow 
subset of hacktivism is sufficiently similar to traditional forms of protest 
to warrant protection under widely accepted free speech principles. 
I. Background 
A. A Brief Description of Hacktivism 
 The term hacktivism has been defined as the nonviolent use for 
political ends of “illegal or legally ambiguous digital tools” like website 
defacements, information theft, website parodies, DoS attacks, virtual 
sit-ins, and virtual sabotage.25 Capitalizing on the power and pervasive-
                                                                                                                      
23 See Noa Bar-Yosef, How Operation Payback and Hacktivism Are Rocking the ’Net, Securi-
tyWeek (Dec. 15, 2010), http:www.securityweek.com/how-operation-payback-and-hack 
tivism-are-rocking-net; Jan-Keno Janssen et al., Operation Payback: Protests via Mouse Click, H 
Security (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Operation-Pay 
back-protests-via-mouse-click-1150790.html. 
24 See Nat’l Security Council, Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and 
Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure, at iv, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf (2010); 
Daniel E. Geer, Jr., Cybersecurity and National Policy, 1 Harv. Nat’l Security J. at i, ix (2010); 
Jessica L. McCurdy, Computer Crimes, 47 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 287, 326 (2010). 
25 See Alexandra Whitney Samuel, Hacktivism and the Future of Political Participation, at 
iii (Sept. 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University), available at http://www. 
alexandrasamuel.com/dissertation/pdfs/Samuel-Hacktivism-entire.pdf. Samuels’ work gives 
a thorough, empirical analysis of hacktivism from the perspective of a political scientist. See 
generally id. 
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ness of the Internet, hacktivists attempt to exploit its manifold access 
points to gain publicity and spread information about their views.26 
 Although it has not always carried a clever name, people have 
turned to hacktivism since the Internet’s early days.27 For example, to 
protest the passage of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, a 
hacker defaced the website of the Department of Justice (DOJ) with 
images and commentary: 
Free speech in the land of the free? Arms in the home of the 
brave? Privacy in a state of wiretaps and government intru-
sion? Unreasonable searches? We are a little behind our 1984 
deadline, but working slowly one amendment at a time. It is 
hard to trick hundreds of millions of people out of their free-
doms, but we should be complete within a decade.28 
Furthermore, as the behavior of The Jester and Anonymous demon-
strates, hacktivism is often used by all sides in a debate.29 
 As the Internet has evolved, so too have the tools used by hacktiv-
ists to pursue their ideological goals; moreover, an individual’s objective 
and point of view will likely determine his form of hacktivism.30 Forms 
of hacktivism run the gamut from those that are clearly covered by ex-
isting anti-hacking laws—like redirects, site defacements, and DoS at-
tacks31—to forms, like virtual sit-ins, whose legality is far less certain.32 
B. Hacktivism versus Hacking 
 Although hacktivism has its origins in both hacking and activism,33 
distinguishing between hacktivism and hacking is not straightforward.34 
In one sense, the two practices have divergent motives: hacking is often 
done out of the hacker’s self-interest, while hacktivism is often done to 
achieve a social or political goal.35 But the term hacking has not always 
                                                                                                                      
26 See id. at 5. 
27 See id. at 9; Bar-Yosef, supra note 23. 
28 Samuel, supra note 25, at 9 (citing a copy of a site defacement stored on a mirror 
site unavailable to the public). 
29 Compare Lee, supra note 5 (analyzing th3j35t3r’s attacks on WikiLeaks), with Correll, 
Payback, supra note 17 (analyzing the response of members of Anonymous to the 
WikiLeaks controversy). 
30 See Samuel, supra note 25 at 8, 48–49. 
31 See id. at 49. 
32 See id. at 71, 72. 
33 See id. at iii. 
34 See id. at 39. 
35 See id. at 4. 
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been used to describe the conduct of a cybercriminal.36 It originally 
described an innovative use of technology to solve a problem.37 In addi-
tion, hacking is frequently practiced in defense or furtherance of a 
unique set of norms that have developed as part of the Internet’s cul-
ture.38 For present purposes, however, hacking may be differentiated 
from hacktivism, in that hacking lacks political objectives.39 
 Much hacking is motivated by nefarious and fraudulent aims.40 
Hackers are responsible for identity theft, fraud, commercial espio-
nage, and other crimes with an annual cost in the trillions of dollars.41 
The FBI has declared that cybercrime is the most significant criminal 
threat facing the United States, and that anti-cybercrime efforts are a 
top priority, behind only counterterrorism and counterintelligence.42 
 Moreover, cyberwarfare, waged by hackers on behalf of state and 
non-state actors, is considered the next phase in the evolution of 
threats to national security.43 As such, this species of hacking arguably is 
motivated by political objectives.44 A major difference from hacktivism, 
however, is that hacking in cyberwarfare may be analogized to opera-
tions on the battlefront, while some forms of hacktivism are more 
analogous to sit-ins or other forms of nonviolent civil disobedience.45 
Mike McConnell, former Director of National Intelligence, told Presi-
dent Bush in 2007 that if the perpetrators of the September 11th at-
tacks had instead successfully targeted a single American bank with cy-
ber-attacks, the damage to the U.S. economy would have been “an 
order-of-magnitude” greater.46 Similarly, law enforcement officials fear 
that cyber-attacks on the networks crucial to the nation’s critical infra-
                                                                                                                      
36 See Samuel, supra note 25, at 39–44. 
37 See id. at 51. 
38 See id. at 39. 
39 But see id. at 42 (noting that while hacking may seem apolitical on its face, certain 
aspects of hacker culture are inherently political). 
40 See id. at 4; Steven R. Chabinsky, Deputy Assistant Dir., Cyber Div., FBI, Address at 
the GovSec/FOSE Conference, Washington, D.C.: The Cyber Threat: Who’s Doing What 
to Whom (Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-cyber-threat-
whos-doing-what-to-whom. 
41 See Will Knight, Hacking Will Cost World $1.6 Trillion This Year, ZDNet (U.K.) ( July 
11, 2000), http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/security-management/2000/07/11/hacking-will-
cost-world-16-trillion-this-year-2080075/. 
42 See Chabinsky, supra note 40. 
43 See Robert S. Mueller, III, Dir., FBI, Address at the RSA Cyber Security Conf., San 
Francisco, CA: Tackling the Cyber Threat (Mar. 4, 2010), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ 
news/speeches/tackling-the-cyber-threat. 
44 Compare id., with Samuel, supra note 25, at 6. 
45 Compare Mueller, supra note 43, with Samuel, supra note 25, at 6. 
46 See Lawrence Wright, The Spymaster, New Yorker, Jan. 21, 2008, at 51. 
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structure—for example, air traffic control systems, electrical grids, and 
water purification systems—could have even more catastrophic conse-
quences.47 
 By contrast, hacktivism tends to be motivated by political concerns 
that are at least partly focused on “offline” issues.48 It is engaged pri-
marily with communicative, not destructive, goals.49 For example, the 
defacement of the DOJ website in protest of the Communications De-
cency Act of 1996 reflects both political support for individual rights 
and concerns that the implicated legislation would degrade the culture 
and value of the Internet through censorship.50 It also reflects the 
communicative element of hacktivism, in that the website remained 
largely operational during and after the attack, and the cost of repair-
ing the defacement was minimal.51 
C. Forms of Hacktivism 
 To analyze hacktivism as a form of protest, five methods are particu-
larly well-suited for discussion in light of their popularity and the varying 
degrees to which each resembles legitimate expression. It should be 
noted, though, that as technology evolves, so too will the forms of hack-
tivism. As a result, the methods described below are merely a sample of 
hacktivism as it has existed in the recent past; the most popular methods 
could be very different in the near future. The principles that this Note 
argues should be applied to determine whether a form of hacktivism 
ought to receive protection as a legitimate form of protest, however, re-
main the same. 
1. Denial-of-Service Attacks 
 DoS attacks, the form of hacktivism frequently used during the 
WikiLeaks incident, involve attempts to block access to websites by any 
of several means.52 Access to the targeted site can slow significantly or 
                                                                                                                      
47 See Mark G. Milone, Hacktivism: Securing the National Infrastructure, 58 Bus. Law. 383, 
385 (2002). 
48 See Samuel, supra note 25, at 14. 
49 Cf. id. at 51, 54, 216, 235 (noting that a significant objective of hacktivism is com-
munication). 
50 Cf. id. at 9, 42; supra text accompanying note 28. 
51 Cf. id. at 54 (explaining that as a primarily communicative method of hacktivism, 
site defacements leave the targeted sites largely unharmed). 
52 See Samuel, supra note 25, at 10; Natasha Lomas, Security from A to Z: DDoS, CNET 
News, (Nov. 27, 2006), http://news.cnet.com/Security-from-A-to-Z-DDoS/2100-7349_3-61 
38447.html?tag=mncol;2n. 
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be prevented entirely while the attack is underway.53 During a common 
type of DoS attack, the party initiating the attack saturates the com-
puter server hosting the target website with requests for information, 
dramatically increasing the consumption of computational resources 
and eventually causing the server to slow down or reset.54 
 A popular iteration of the DoS attack is a DDoS attack, which may 
be distinguished from a DoS attack by its use of a network of multiple 
attacking computers.55 In a DDoS attack, the initiating party activates a 
network of computers under its control, called a botnet, to multiply the 
power of the attack, thereby directing an exponentially increased vol-
ume of information requests to the target server.56 So-called because of 
the manner in which the computers—known as “slaves” or “zombies” — 
are manipulated by the party initiating the attack, botnets are networks 
of individual computers that have been infiltrated by a virus or other 
malicious program that brings them under the control of the infiltra-
tor.57 
 Generally, in order to compromise the security of the infiltrated 
computer, the virus exploits vulnerabilities in the system.58 There is no 
shortage of such vulnerabilities, particularly on home computers and 
networks.59 Consequently, botnets are widespread and numerous.60 In 
fact, reports suggest that the supply of botnets far exceeds demand, 
leading to a steep drop in their rental price.61 With so low a barrier to 
entry, DDoS capability is proliferating.62 
 Unsurprisingly, DDoS attacks have increased substantially in the 
past few years.63 And along with enhanced DDoS capacity has come 
                                                                                                                      
53 See Samuel, supra note 25, at 10. 
54 See Denial of Service Attacks, CERT Software Engineering Inst., http://www.cert. 
org/tech_tips/denial_of_service.html (last visited May 17, 2012). 
55 See Charalampos Patrikakis et al., Distributed Denial of Service Attacks, Internet Pro-
tocol J., Dec. 2004, at 13, available at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac123/ac147/ 
archived_issues/ipj_7-4/ipj_7-4.pdf. 
56 See id. at 13, 20; Robert McMillan, With Botnets Everywhere, DDoS Attacks Get Cheaper, 
Computerworld (Oct. 14, 2009), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9139398/ 
With_botnets_everywhere_DDoS_attacks_get_cheaper. 
57 See Patrikakis et al., supra note 55, at 13; McMillan, supra note 56. 
58 See Patrikakis et al., supra note 55, at 13. 
59 See Geer, supra note 24, at xi; McMillan, supra note 56. 
60 See McMillan, supra note 56. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 Compare Samuel, supra note 25, at 10 (noting that as of 2004, DDoS attacks are rarely 
used by hacktivists), with McMillan, supra note 56 (describing an increase in DDoS attacks 
between 2008 and 2009). 
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improved and vastly simplified operating software.64 The software that 
was widely used during the WikiLeaks episode was called the Low Orbit 
Ion Cannon (LOIC), which enabled even novice users to join in the 
DDoS attacks by making participation relatively simple.65 LOIC allowed 
users to participate in the attacks in two ways: directly, by entering the 
target IP address and clicking “fire”; or, alternatively, by volunteering 
their computer or network to the so-called “LOIC Hivemind,” and 
thereby allowing other users to direct attacks from the surrendered sys-
tem.66 The latter option describes a voluntary botnet, in which each 
computer in the controlled network has effectively been donated for a 
prescribed use.67 Unlike members of involuntary botnets, LOIC users 
retain the ability to add or remove their computers from the attacking 
network.68 
 Because of the structure of the Internet, DDoS attacks often impli-
cate the laws of multiple nations.69 An initiating party located in coun-
try A can control a network of computers located in countries B, C, and 
D to attack a website hosted on servers located in country E.70 Thus, 
the victim, the evidence, and the perpetrator may be located in differ-
ent countries, many of which likely have different cybersecurity re-
gimes, or no regime at all.71 
2. Site Defacements 
 Site defacements, like that perpetrated against the DOJ website, 
are believed to be the most common form of hacktivism.72 They involve 
obtaining unauthorized access to a web server and either replacing or 
altering a web page with new content that conveys a particular mes-
sage.73 Defacements may be limited to a single site, or they may occur 
                                                                                                                      
64 See George V. Hulme, LOIC Tool Enables “Easy” WikiLeaks-Driven DDoS Attacks, CSO 
Online (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.csoonline.com/article/646813/loic-tool-enables-easy-
wikileaks-driven-ddos-attacks. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. 
67 See Geoff Duncan, WikiLeaks Supporters Using Volunteer and Zombie Botnets, Digital 
Trends (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/wikileaks-supporters-
using-volunteer-and-zombie-botnets/. 
68 See id. 
69 See Geer, supra note 24, at ix. 
70 See id.; Patrikakis et al., supra note 55, at 20–21. 
71 See Ryan M.F. Baron, A Critique of the International Cybercrime Treaty, 10 CommLaw 
Conspectus 263, 270 (2002). 
72 See Samuel, supra note 25, at 9. 
73 See id. at 8. 
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in huge volumes across hundreds or thousands of sites.74 Yet, although 
they effectively hijack the targeted site in order to communicate a mes-
sage, defacements do not necessarily damage the targeted site.75 In-
stead, site defacements are commonly used not only as a means to 
communicate a message, but also to demonstrate the technical prowess 
of the defacer; that is, they are as much about garnering attention for 
the perpetrator as they are about raising awareness for a cause.76 
3. Site Redirects 
 As the name suggests, redirects send users to a site that is different 
than the one indicated by the web address.77 That is, by gaining unau-
thorized access to a web server and adjusting the address settings, the 
perpetrator causes would-be users to reach an alternative site.78 Quite 
often, the alternative site is critical of the original, searched-for site.79 
By this method, the hacktivist essentially hijacks access to the targeted 
site and asserts control over the content that is displayed when an 
Internet user enters the web address of the targeted site.80 
4. Virtual Sit-Ins 
 As a form of hacktivism, the virtual sit-in can be compared to a 
DDoS attack in the sense that the object of both methods is to slow or 
crash a targeted server by overwhelming it with requests for informa-
tion.81 The difference is that rather than commanding a network of 
voluntary or involuntary botnets, virtual sit-ins involve individual pro-
testors reloading web pages.82 Some virtual sit-ins are accomplished 
simply by users manually and repeatedly reloading the targeted web 
page; others allow participants to download special code that automati-
cally and repeatedly reloads the targeted site.83 The virtual sit-in is con-
sidered “a mass form of hacktivism . . . [and] a more democratic or 
representative form of hacktivism.”84 
                                                                                                                      
74 See id. at 9. 
75 See id. at 54. 
76 See id. at 55. 
77 See id. at 10. 
78 See Samuel, supra note 25, at 10. 
79 Id. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. at 12. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. at 12–13. 
84 Samuel, supra note 25, at 12. 
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5. Information Theft 
 Finally, information theft, a method of hacktivism that is arguably 
indistinguishable from ordinary burglary, involves gaining unauthorized 
access to a computer or network and stealing private data.85 Although 
the illegality of information theft is probably the least ambiguous of the 
methods of hacktivism described in this section, it is surprisingly, and 
distressingly, well-accepted by hacktivists.86 
II. Discussion 
 The threat posed by hackers has not eluded lawmakers. Indeed, 
most advanced nations have enacted laws that prohibit hacking.87 To 
coordinate international anti-hacking efforts, the 2001 Council of 
Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Convention) established a frame-
work for domestic legal regimes.88 The prescribed regimes are general 
in scope, and could conceivably be applied to forms of hacktivism that 
resemble traditional forms of protest.89 The legal systems in the United 
States and the United Kingdom both feature long established princi-
ples and doctrine protective of the freedom of expression.90 In the con-
text of hacktivism as a form of protest, these doctrines could be used to 
shield a narrow subset of hacktivism from the general prohibition on 
hacking.91 
A. The European Convention on Cybercrime 
 Because its drafters deemed international cooperation critical to 
effective cybercrime regulation, the Convention prescribes a common 
criminal policy regarding cybercrime,92 and signatory parties are 
bound to establish domestic criminal laws governing intentional acts of 
                                                                                                                      
85 Id. at 11. 
86 See id. at 123, 137, 143–44. 
87 See, e.g., Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006); Computer Misuse 
Act, 1990, c. 18 (Eng.) (amended 2008), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
1990/18/data.pdf; Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, 2296 U.N.T.S. 167 [herein-
after Convention]. 
88 See generally Convention, supra note 87. 
89 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030; Computer Misuse Act, c. 18 (Eng.). 
90 See discussion infra Parts II.B–C. 
91 See discussion infra Part III. 
92 See Convention, supra note 87, pmbl. 
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cybercrime.93 The Convention outlines requirements for substantive 
laws concerning offenses against the integrity of computer data and 
systems.94 
1. Definitions 
 Article 2 of the Convention requires regulation of illegal access to 
computer systems.95 Parties are obligated to enact criminal laws prohib-
iting access to any part of a computer system “without right.”96 Article 2 
specifies that such access may be obtained either by circumventing se-
curity measures or by exploiting authorized access to one system to gain 
unauthorized access to other systems.97 In addition, parties may require 
that unlawful access be motivated by intent to obtain computer data or 
other dishonest intent.98 
 The Convention also requires parties to establish criminal laws 
prohibiting the intentional, unauthorized interception of computer 
data. 99 Article 3 specifies that such interception should be prohibited 
when it is accomplished by technical means and when the intercepted 
data is part of a nonpublic transmission.100 Moreover, the interception 
of “electromagnetic emissions” from computer systems is prohibited.101 
 Similarly, Articles 4 and 5 respectively require parties to prohibit 
interference with both data and systems.102 The Convention provides 
that data interference may be accomplished when a person intention-
ally and without authorization damages, deletes, deteriorates, alters, or 
suppresses computer data.103 Article 4 states that parties may require 
that data interference result in serious harm before criminal liability 
                                                                                                                      
93 See id. art. 2. The Convention mandates that signatories create new cybercrimes, 
which may not have been recognized as offenses under existing legal regimes. See Baron, 
supra note 71, at 270. 
94 See id. § 1. 
95 See id. art. 2. The Convention defines computer systems as devices, either freestand-
ing or networked with other devices, that perform automatic data processing using a pro-
gram. Id. art. 1(a). 
96 Id. art. 2. 
97 See id. 
98 See Convention, supra note 87, art. 2. 
99 Id. at art. 3. Computer data is defined as “any representation of facts, information or 
concepts in a form suitable for processing in a computer system, including a program suit-
able to cause a computer system to perform a function.” Id. art. 1(b). 
100 Id. art. 3. 
101 Id. 
102 See id. arts. 4, 5. 
103 Id. art. 4(1). 
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attaches.104 Article 5 obligates parties to prohibit intentional system in-
terference.105 Actions cause system interference when they seriously 
hinder the functioning of a computer system by the inputting or 
transmitting of data, or the manipulation of data by many of the same 
means involved in data interference.106 
 In addition to outlining a regime of criminal laws governing data 
and computer systems, the Convention also describes laws regarding 
the misuse of devices.107 Unlike the provisions governing data and 
computer systems, Article 6 does not impose liability so long as the de-
vices in question are not used to commit offenses set forth in Articles 2 
through 5.108 For devices that are designed or adapted primarily to in-
tercept or interfere with data or systems, however, parties are obligated 
to enact laws prohibiting their possession, “production, sale, procure-
ment for use, import, distribution or otherwise” being made available if 
they are intended for use in the commission of offenses under Articles 
2 through 5.109 Furthermore, Article 6 imposes the same restrictions on 
computer passwords, access codes, and similar information capable of 
accessing any part of a computer system.110 
2. Domestic Regimes Prescribed by the Convention 
 The Convention outlines requirements for domestic laws regard-
ing computer-related offenses.111 Article 7 mandates that parties estab-
lish anti-forgery laws to prohibit the intentional, unauthorized manipu-
lation or fabrication of data that results in inauthentic data intended to 
be accepted as genuine.112 The Article further stipulates that parties are 
free to condition criminal liability on intent to defraud or other dis-
honest intent.113 Relatedly, Article 8 describes antifraud laws to prohibit 
interference with or manipulation of data or systems that deprive vic-
tims of property with the fraudulent intent of procuring an economic 
benefit for the perpetrator.114 
                                                                                                                      
104 Convention, supra note 87, art. 4(2). 
105 Id. art. 5. 
106 See id. art. 5. 
107 See id. art. 6. 
108 See id. art. 6(2). 
109 Id. 
110 Convention, supra note 87, art. 6(1). 
111 See id. tit. 2. 
112 Id. art. 7. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. art. 8. 
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 Finally, the Convention requires parties to establish laws concern-
ing “offences related to infringements of copyright and related 
rights,”115 and to establish a legal regime governing ancillary and cor-
porate liability for accessories to cybercrime.116 The Convention is not 
exhaustive of the possible forms of cybercrime, however, and it author-
izes parties to enact laws regarding all “other criminal offences commit-
ted by means of a computer system.”117 
3. Enforcement Provisions of the Convention 
 The Convention requires parties to establish procedures to allow 
domestic law enforcement to implement the new laws and investigate 
and prosecute cybercrimes.118 It also stipulates that parties must coop-
erate with each other in the enforcement of cybercrime laws.119 The 
Convention describes extradition arrangements that provide for the 
extradition of suspects from one party state to another to face charges 
arising from cybercrime laws enacted under the Convention.120 In addi-
tion, the Convention encourages mutual assistance between parties to 
investigate and prosecute cybercrimes.121 
 Beyond mandating the establishment of domestic cybercrime laws, 
though, the Convention requires that the implementation and applica-
tion of laws enacted under the Convention accord with international 
agreements concerning the protection of human and civil rights.122 
Specifically, Article 15 refers to the 1950 Council of Europe Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
1966 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and “other applicable international human rights instru-
ments.”123 The Article requires incorporation of the principle of pro-
portionality, and provides that judicial supervision should be given 
where appropriate.124 Lastly, Article 15 obligates parties to consider the 
impact of such laws on the rights and interests of third parties.125 
                                                                                                                      
115 Id. art. 10. 
116 See Convention, supra note 87, tit. 5. 
117 See id. art. 14(2). 
118 See id. art. 14(1). 
119 Id. art. 23. 
120 Id. art. 24. 
121 Id. arts. 25, 27–34. 
122 Convention, supra note 87, art. 15. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. art. 15. 
125 Id. art. 15(3). 
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B. The American Domestic Regime 
1.The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 2006 
 At least forty different federal statutes govern computer-related 
crimes in the United States.126 Foremost among these for the regula-
tion of hacking and, potentially, hacktivism, is the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act of 2006 (CFAA).127 Under the statute, seven categories of 
conduct are prohibited as they relate to “protected computers,” which 
are defined as: 
[A] computer . . . used by or for a financial institution or the 
United States Government . . . or, which is used in interstate 
or foreign commerce or communication, including a com-
puter located outside the United States that is used in a man-
ner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communi-
cation of the United States.128 
In other words, any computer in the United States that is connected to 
the Internet, and even some foreign computers, are subject to the 
CFAA.129 Subsection (a)(1) of the statute prohibits obtaining or trans-
mitting classified information through unauthorized computer access if 
the actor has “reason to believe” the information could be used either 
to the detriment of the United States, or to the advantage of any for-
eign nation.130 The next subsection prohibits obtaining financial in-
formation, information from any government entity, or information 
from any “protected computer,” through unauthorized computer ac-
cess.131 Third, the CFAA forbids unauthorized access of any nonpublic 
computer of the United States government.132 Subsection (a)(4) pro-
scribes unauthorized computer access with intent to defraud and ob-
tain something of value.133 
 The fifth subsection, § 1030(a)(5), is directed specifically at hack-
ing.134 The provision describes two distinct types of offenses.135 The 
first type involves knowingly transmitting “a program, code or com-
                                                                                                                      
126 See McCurdy, supra note 24, at 300. 
127 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006); see McCurdy, supra note 24, at 304. 
128 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2); see McCurdy, supra note 24, at 304–05. 
129 McCurdy, supra note 24, at 304; see 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2). 
130 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1). 
131 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). 
132 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3). 
133 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). 
134 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5); McCurdy, supra note 24, at 305. 
135 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A); McCurdy, supra note 24, at 305. 
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mand that intentionally causes damage to a protected computer,” re-
gardless of whether the actor has authorized access.136 The second type 
of offense involves unauthorized access of a protected computer that 
causes damage.137 This type of offense does not require intent to cause 
damage or loss, and liability can attach as a result of either recklessness 
or negligence.138 
 The sixth subsection forbids the knowing trafficking of passwords 
or similar information with intent to defraud that permits unauthor-
ized computer access if the trafficking affects interstate or foreign 
commerce, or if the accessed computer is used by or for the U.S. gov-
ernment.139 Finally, subsection § 1030(a)(7) prohibits the transmission, 
with intent to extort, of any communication that threatens to damage a 
protected computer; to gain unauthorized access to a protected com-
puter and retrieve or impair confidential information; or to extort 
money in the course of damaging a protected computer.140 
2. U.S. Courts and the Right to Protest 
 The distinction between permissible protest and impermissible 
disruption has been a subject of controversy for generations.141 Accord-
ing to the U.S. Supreme Court, “the right to engage in peaceful and 
orderly political demonstrations is, under appropriate conditions, a 
fundamental aspect of ‘liberty’ protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”142 Even protests that rile the audience or cause excitement that 
is potentially disruptive to the civic peace are generally protected so 
long as they are not “directed to inciting or producing imminent law-
less action and [are not] likely to incite or produce such action.”143 In 
the context of the First Amendment, contributions to the civic debate 
on matters of public concern are considered essential to a functioning 
                                                                                                                      
136 McCurdy, supra note 24, at 305; see 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i). 
137 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii)–(iii); McCurdy, supra note 24, at 305. 
138 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii); McCurdy, supra note 24, at 305. 
139 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(6). 
140 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(7). 
141 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56–60 (1999) (striking down city’s 
anti-loitering statute as unconstitutionally vague and violative of due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 passim (1969) (overturning a 
criminal conviction arising from the defendant’s public desecration of American flag and 
associated comments he made to an assembled crowd). 
142 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 161 (1969) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). 
143 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
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democracy,144 and the Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to 
allow punishment of false or even grievously offensive speech in this 
area.145 
 The government’s ability to limit protest by imposing reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions on speech, however, is largely un-
questioned.146 In this sense, protests can be channeled, but not stifled 
completely, even if they are peaceful and involve matters of public con-
cern.147 Restrictions of this kind must be “content-neutral,” in that they 
cannot prohibit speech on the basis of its subject matter or the 
speaker’s identity or viewpoint, they must serve a significant govern-
ment interest, and they must leave open ample alternative avenues for 
communication.148 Such restrictions are permissible even on speech 
that occurs in areas, like public streets, that traditionally have been 
used for the exchange of ideas.149 In the context of the Internet, and as 
applied specifically to hacktivism, it is not entirely clear what form a 
permissible time, place and manner restriction can take.150 
                                                                                                                      
144 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). In an important and oft-
quoted passage, Justice Roberts declared that “the people of this nation have ordained in 
the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties 
are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the 
citizens of a democracy.” Id. 
145 See id.; see also Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (“[A]s a Nation we 
have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure 
that we do not stifle public debate.”); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 passim 
(1964) (overturning jury verdict for defamation against a newspaper for statements pub-
lished in a full-page issue advertisement concerning the treatment of civil rights protestors 
by police and state officials). 
146 See, e.g., Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (upholding a municipal ordi-
nance specifically prohibiting residential picketing directed at, and occurring in front of, a 
residence); Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98–99 (1972) (invalidating a 
municipal anti-picketing ordinance on equal protection grounds, but recognizing the 
government’s ability to regulate picketing and other forms of protest through reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949) (upholding 
a municipal ordinance prohibiting the use of sound trucks on public streets). 
147 See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487; Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98–99; Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 83. 
148 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986). 
149 See Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 87. Writing for a plurality, Justice Reed noted that “[c]ity 
streets are recognized as a normal place for the exchange of ideas by speech or paper. But 
this does not mean the freedom is beyond all control.” Id. 
150 The Supreme Court has yet to address the question of time, place, and manner re-
strictions on Internet conduct, and the decisions of lower courts have been limited primar-
ily to a variant of the question involving domain name registration. See, e.g., Name.Space, 
Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 587 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that an amend-
ment to a U.S. Department of Commerce agreement concerning competition in domain 
name registration was a valid time, place, and manner restriction). 
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 The public forum doctrine generally protects speech in “places 
which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to 
assembly and debate.”151 In a public forum, the government may im-
pose content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.152 It may 
also impose a licensing or permit system for the use of public forums so 
long as the system serves an important purpose, leaves virtually no dis-
cretion to the licensing authority, and provides procedural safeguards 
including judicial review of license denials.153 Moreover, the public fo-
rum doctrine has potential ramifications for speech on private prop-
erty, if the property is open to the public.154 It is as yet unclear, however, 
how, if at all, the Supreme Court will apply the public forum doctrine 
in the context of the Internet.155 
C. The British Domestic Regime 
1. The Computer Misuse Act of 1990 
 In the United Kingdom, acts of hacktivism generally fall under the 
Computer Misuse Act of 1990 (CMA).156 Unlike the American CFAA, 
the CMA does not define the machines protected by its provisions.157 
Instead, the statute prohibits unauthorized access to “computer mate-
rial” and defines the actions to which criminal liability will attach.158 
Section 1 provides that a person violates the CMA by knowingly and 
intentionally gaining unauthorized access to programs or data held in 
any computer.159 The provision clarifies the intent requirement by not-
ing that the perpetrator need not intend to gain access to a particular 
                                                                                                                      
151 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
152 See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 714 (2000) (upholding a state law restricting 
protests outside of health care facilities); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 
U.S. 288, 289 (1984) (upholding a National Park Service regulation prohibiting sleeping 
overnight in public parks); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (affirming 
convictions for violations of a municipal ordinance requiring a special permit to hold a 
parade). 
153 See Cox, 312 U.S. at 576. 
154 See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 79 (1980) (affirming state su-
preme court decision upholding state constitutional amendment protecting speech in 
privately owned shopping centers, and thereby preventing property owners from exclud-
ing certain speakers). 
155 See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 215 (2003) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (noting that the public forum doctrine is inapplicable to a statute condition-
ing receipt of federal funds on implementation of filtering software in public libraries). 
156 Computer Misuse Act, c. 18 (Eng.). 
157 Id. § 1. Compare with 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
158 Computer Misuse Act, c. 18 (Eng.). 
159 Id. § 1(1). 
2012] Hacktivism: A New Breed of Protest in a Networked World 529 
program or data of any kind on any computer; intentionally gaining 
unauthorized access to the information is sufficient for culpability.160 
The section further states that the maximum sentence of incarceration 
is two years.161 
 Section 2 of the CMA prohibits actions that violate Section 1 and 
that are taken with intent to commit further offenses, or to allow others 
to commit offenses by means of unauthorized access.162 Specifically, 
Section 2 applies to crimes for which there are statutorily fixed sen-
tences or to offenses carrying sentences of five years or more.163 The 
further crimes need not occur at the same time as unauthorized access 
is gained, nor even be possible; the section prohibits arranging for fur-
ther offenses even if the planned offenses are in fact impossible.164 The 
maximum sentence for offenses made in contemplation of further 
crimes is five years.165 
 Particularly relevant to DDoS attacks and site defacements, Section 
3 prohibits unauthorized acts that impair the operation of a computer, 
prevent or hinder access to programs or data on a computer, or enable 
others to impair computer operations or hinder access to systems.166 A 
person violates Section 3 if he knowingly does “any unauthorized act in 
relation to a computer.”167 Notably, liability attaches under this section 
even if the acts are not intentional, but simply reckless.168 
 As with Section 2, a prohibited act need not be intended to affect a 
particular computer, program, or data; the act need only be intended 
to have some effect on some computer, program, or data.169 The Sec-
tion further specifies that acts whose effect is only temporary are never-
theless prohibited, as if the effect was permanent.170 The maximum 
sentence under this section is ten years.171 
 Section 3A prohibits making, supplying, or obtaining “articles” to 
be used in offenses under Sections 1 and 3.172 “Article” is defined as any 
                                                                                                                      
160 Id. § 1(2). 
161 Id. § 1(3). 
162 Id. § 2(1). 
163 Id. § 2(2). 
164 Computer Misuse Act, § 2(3)–(4). 
165 Id. § 2(5). 
166 Id. § 3(2). 
167 Id. § 3(1). 
168 Id. § 3(4). 
169 See id. § 3(4). 
170 See Computer Misuse Act, § 3(5)(c). 
171 Id. § 3(6). 
172 Id. § 3A. 
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program or data held in electronic form.173 This provision is violated if a 
person supplies or offers to supply an item believing that it is likely to be 
used to commit or assist in the commission of an act which violates Sec-
tions 1 or 3.174 Violations under Section 3A are punishable by a maxi-
mum sentence of two years.175 
 Section 4 of the CMA describes the territorial scope of offenses 
under Sections 1 through 3. Although it requires “at least one signifi-
cant link with domestic jurisdiction,”176 the section states that it is “im-
material” whether the offense itself was committed in the United King-
dom, or whether the accused was in the United Kingdom when the 
offense was committed.177 Section 5 provides that either the accused 
person’s presence in the United Kingdom at the time the act was com-
mitted, or the presence of the computer that was wrongfully accessed, 
constitute a significant link with domestic jurisdiction.178 
2. British Courts and the Right of Expression 
 In the United Kingdom, free speech receives less robust protection 
than in the United States.179 Indeed, some argue that free speech in 
the United Kingdom is almost totally reliant on “cultural norms to 
check the abuse of government power to restrict or ban expression.”180 
Judicial review of laws restricting speech is largely nonexistent; the 
freedom of speech is protected nearly exclusively by parliamentary 
“self-control.”181 The United Kingdom does not have a written constitu-
tion, and the only textual protection for speech rights is the Human 
Rights Act of 1998 (HRA),182 which codifies, among other things, Arti-
                                                                                                                      
173 Id. § 3A(4). 
174 Id. § 3A(2). 
175 Id. § 3A(5). 
176 Computer Misuse Act, § 4(2). 
177 Id. § 4(1). 
178 Id. § 5(2)–(3). 
179 See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The First Amendment in Cross-Cultural 
Perspective: A Comparative Legal Analysis of the Freedom of Speech 184–85 (2006) 
(describing the speech restrictions permissible in the United Kingdom under the Human 
Rights Act of 1998); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Harmonizing Internet Law: Les-
sons from Europe, J. Internet L., May 2006, at 3 (noting stronger protections for speech in the 
United States than in the United Kingdom); Francis Welch, The “Broadcast Ban” on Sinn Fein, 
BBC News (Apr. 5, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4409447.stm (de-
scribing the British government’s direct broadcast ban for organizations in Northern Ireland 
thought to support terrorism). 
180 See, e.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 179, at 187. 
181 Id. at 187–88. 
182 Id. at 184. 
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cle 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms.183 
 This is not to say that speech rights are unprotected in the United 
Kingdom; to the contrary, at common law free speech is a legal princi-
ple to be considered by courts interpreting acts of Parliament or decid-
ing cases that implicate speech rights.184 British courts frequently have 
invoked the common law principle to cabin laws that would otherwise 
inhibit the exercise of free speech.185 In libel cases, for example, British 
courts have formulated fair comment and privilege defenses that pro-
tect speech.186 Common law principles of free speech have also been 
invoked to limit the scope of legislation that could have restricted 
speech rights.187 
 Nevertheless, partly because of the absence of a constitutional 
guarantee of free speech, common law presumptions require a balanc-
ing of speech rights against other, competing rights that may weigh 
against free speech.188 In addition, there has been little consideration 
in British courts of the extent of free speech rights outside certain, well-
established areas of law—namely, defamation, breach of confidence, 
and contempt of court.189 As a result, the principle of free speech in 
the United Kingdom remains comparatively limited at common law.190 
III. Analysis 
A. Hacktivism as Legitimate Protest 
 This Note argues that those forms of hacktivism that are primarily 
expressive, that do not involve obtaining or exploiting illegal access to 
computers or networks for commercial advantage or financial gain, and 
                                                                                                                      
183 See id. at 183. Article 10 provides that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of ex-
pression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of fron-
tiers.” Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
10(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. The freedoms described in 
paragraph 1 are qualified, however, by paragraph 2, which declares that “[t]he exercise of 
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. . . restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society.” Id. art. 10(2). 
184 See Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech 41 (2d ed. 2005). 
185 See id. at 40. 
186 See id. 
187 See id. at 41. 
188 See id. at 41–42. 
189 See id. at 42. 
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that cause little or no permanent damage, should receive at least some 
protection as a legitimate form of protest. As an initial matter, to carve 
out protection for hacktivism in the existing international anti-hacking 
legal regime, it is necessary to distinguish between harmful, and thus 
rightly prohibited, forms of hacking, and types of hacktivism that are 
primarily expressive, do not exploit illegal access to networks and com-
puters, and do not cause serious damage.191 Unsurprisingly, this is eas-
ier said than done.192 
 Just as traditional means of protest can inconvenience and frustrate 
both the object of the protest and the general public, hacktivism, too, 
can often seem more like a nuisance than an exercise of protected 
rights of expression.193 And the unique forum of online protest— cyber-
space, which exists on privately owned servers, and yet functions as a 
global public square194—further complicates the question of whether 
the Internet is an appropriate situs for demonstration.195 Nevertheless, 
the same democratic interests that require toleration of civil demonstra-
tion in the physical world demand that a narrow subset of hacktivism be 
protected as a legitimate form of political protest.196 Given that hacktiv-
ism may take a wide variety of forms,197 to separate the “good” hacktiv-
ism from the “bad,” it is useful first to establish some parameters. 
1. Hacktivism as Protected Expression 
 To warrant protection, it is not sufficient that hacktivism merely 
convey a message; the world over, graffiti bans are accepted as reason-
able and necessary measures to deter damage to both public and pri-
                                                                                                                      
191 See, e.g., WikiLeaks, Protest and the Law: The Rights and Wrongs of Hacktivism, Econo-
mist, Dec. 16, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17732839. 
192 See Terrence O’Brien, Protesting Hacktivists Replacing Picket Lines with Web Attacks, 
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197 See Samuel, supra note 25, at 7. 
2012] Hacktivism: A New Breed of Protest in a Networked World 533 
vate property.198 Even in the United States, where speech rights are 
heavily guarded by the First Amendment, not all expression receives 
protection.199 Hacktivism that causes damage (for example, informa-
tion theft) or involves the manipulation of hijacked private property 
(for example, DDoS attacks using involuntary botnets) therefore is not 
likely to be considered expression at all.200 
 Like protestors in a picket line, hacktivism within the jurisdiction 
of the United States should be subject to reasonable restrictions on the 
time, place, and manner of the demonstration.201 While it is not at all 
clear what such restrictions would look like in the context of the Inter-
net, given the often critical importance of certain websites as a source 
of vital information, restrictions on otherwise permissible cyberprotests 
are likely in many circumstances.202 For example, virtual sit-ins waged 
against the official website of an incumbent political officeholder that 
                                                                                                                      
198 See, e.g., Ian Edwards, Banksy’s Graffiti: A Not-So-Simple Case of Criminal Damage?, 73 J. 
Crim. L. 345, 345 (2009) (discussing the possible prosecution of graffiti artists under the 
U.K.’s Criminal Damage Act of 1971). 
199 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (upholding a conviction for a 
violation of a state obscenity law on grounds that, inter alia, the material lacked any serious 
artistic, literary, or scientific value). 
200 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Soldier Faces 22 New WikiLeaks Charges, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 
2011, at A6; Michael Cooney, FBI: Operation Bot Roast Finds over 1 Million Botnet Victims, Net-
work World ( June 13, 2007), http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/16193 
(describing FBI investigation and arrest of controllers of involuntary botnets). 
201 See, e.g., Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (upholding a municipal ordi-
nance specifically prohibiting residential picketing directed at, and occurring in front of, a 
residence); Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98–99 (1972) (invalidating a 
municipal anti-picketing ordinance on equal protection grounds, but recognizing the 
government’s ability to regulate picketing and other forms of protest through reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (upholding 
a municipal ordinance prohibiting the use of sound trucks on public streets). 
202 The Supreme Court has not yet addressed time, place, and manner restrictions in 
the context of the Internet; however, because hacktivism can take forms that are analogous 
to traditional methods of protest, restrictions on those forms should be no greater than 
those imposed on the traditional methods. Compare City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 48 
(1994) (invalidating a municipal ordinance prohibiting the display of yard signs on private 
property), Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146–47 (1943) (invalidating a munici-
pal ordinance prohibiting door-to-door distribution of handbills), and Schneider v. State, 
308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (invalidating a municipal anti-leafleting ordinance), with Heffron 
v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 651 (1981) (upholding a state regu-
lation prohibiting the sale or distribution of merchandise and literature at the state fair, 
except from a booth rented from the state, on grounds that the state had sufficiently sub-
stantial interest in regulating solicitation activities at fairgrounds), Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 
828, 838 (1976) (“[T]he business of a military installation . . . is to train soldiers, not to 
provide a public forum.”), and Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47–48 (1966) (“[T]he 
State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under 
its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”). 
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might be otherwise protected could conceivably be prohibited in the 
period leading up to an election.203 Or, while a virtual sit-in by students 
on the website of a high school might be permissible—in response, 
perhaps, to a decision by the administration to cancel prom—the same 
attack made by students on the website of the high school newspaper 
could be punished on the theory that the state has a substantial interest 
in controlling the terms of debate within secondary schools.204 Assum-
ing arguendo—as one must, given the embryonic state of the law—that 
the use of these methods would be cognizable as protected expression, 
they likely would be subject to all manner of other restrictions that the 
Supreme Court has recognized as consistent with the First Amend-
ment.205 
 Hacktivism in the United Kingdom is likely to be even more tightly 
restricted and less likely to be considered protected expression, not-
withstanding the passage of the HRA.206 In the context of the 
                                                                                                                      
 
203 Cf. City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 807–08 (1984) (up-
holding a municipal regulation prohibiting the posting of signs on public property, as ap-
plied to individuals who attached political advertisements to utility poles); Political Hacktivists 
Turn to Web Attacks, BBC News (Feb. 10, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/ 
8506698.stm (describing Australian “cyber-activists” blocking government websites to protest 
proposals to filter content). But cf. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 
898 (2010) (striking down on First Amendment grounds limits on campaign expenditures by 
corporations). 
204 Cf. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988) (upholding 
high school principal’s exclusion of two stories from student newspaper on grounds that 
educators properly retain near-total control over school activities that might reasonably be 
perceived to be endorsed by the school); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 
(1986) (upholding the punishment of a high school student for vulgar speech given in a 
student election); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (holding that 
student expression cannot be suppressed unless it will materially or substantially disrupt 
the work and discipline of the school). But cf. Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 671 
(1973) (finding that a state university violated the First Amendment when it expelled a 
graduate student for distributing newspaper on campus featuring political cartoon depict-
ing a policeman raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice). 
205 See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 714 (upholding a state law restricting protests outside of 
health care facilities); Cox, 312 U.S. at 576 (affirming convictions for violations of a mu-
nicipal ordinance requiring a special permit to hold a parade); Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487 (up-
holding a municipal ordinance specifically prohibiting residential picketing directed at, 
and occurring in front of, a residence); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 289 (up-
holding a National Park Service regulation prohibiting sleeping overnight in public 
parks); Miller, 413 U.S. at 36–37 (upholding a conviction for a violation of a state obscenity 
law on grounds that, inter alia, the material lacked any serious artistic, literary, or scientific 
value); Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 87 (upholding a municipal ordinance prohibiting the use of 
sound trucks on public streets). 
206 See Barendt, supra note 184, at 43 (noting that while the HRA incorporates the guar-
antee of the right of free expression in Article 10 of the ECHR, it is not clear what functions 
are encompassed by the clause); Krotoszynski, supra note 179, at 190 (“[Although] British 
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WikiLeaks controversy, this premise will almost certainly be tested in 
the near future as members of Anonymous have “declared war” on the 
British government.207 Indeed, reports indicate that at least five people 
have already been arrested in the United Kingdom under the CMA for 
their role in attacks related to the WikiLeaks controversy.208 Given the 
British courts’ wide discretion in applying common law principles to 
statutory interpretation, and in light of the uncertainty surrounding 
the interpretation of the HRA,209 as such attacks proliferate it is likely 
that various types of hacktivism will be prosecuted.210 
 It would not be surprising if British courts refused to recognize a 
free speech exception to the CMA for hacktivism, even under the 
HRA.211 There is some precedent, however, that might support finding 
that punishing certain forms of hacktivism would infringe speech 
rights.212 But recent trends suggest that at least in the near future, the 
British government may be increasingly inclined to suppress protest.213 
                                                                                                                      
 
courts do not possess a direct constitutional command to consider free speech claims[,] . . . 
[t]he HRA now establishes a statutory right to the freedom of speech.”). 




209 See Barendt, supra note 184, at 41–42 (explaining that common law presumptions 
require a balancing of speech rights against other rights that may weigh against free 
speech). 
210 See Taylor, supra note 207 (noting criticism of British government’s cybersecurity 
preparedness and vulnerability to DDoS attacks in light of threat of mass cyberprotests). 
211 Compare R v. Shayler, [2002] UKHL 11, [2003] 1 A.C. 247 (H.L.) [6], [36] (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (finding that disclosure of information by former member of security 
service “in the public and national interest” by Official Secrets Act of 1989 was not pro-
tected by freedom of expression under HRA), with Krotoszynski, supra note 179, at 206 
(describing a “rare burst of judicial activism” in which the Law Lords “took upon them-
selves the task of safeguarding the . . . right to free expression”). 
212 See, e.g., Brutus v. Cozens, [1973] A.C. 854 (H.L.) 863 (U.K.) (affirming dismissal of 
charges of using insulting behavior); R v. Home Secretary, ex p Simms [2000] 2 A.C. 115 
(H.L.) 130–31 (finding that provisions of Prison Service Standing Orders should not be 
construed to ban prisoners from giving interviews to journalists on grounds that doing so 
would infringe prisoners’ speech rights). Lord Reid, the renowned common law judge, 
found that “Parliament had to solve the difficult question of how far freedom of speech or 
behaviour must be limited in the general public interest. It would have been going much 
too far to prohibit all speech or conduct likely to occasion a breach of the peace.” There-
fore, “vigorous and . . . distasteful or unmannerly speech . . . is permitted so long as it does 
not go beyond any one of three limits. It must not be threatening. It must not be abusive. 
It must not be insulting.” Brutus, [1973] A.C. 854 at 862. 
213 See, e.g., Mark Hughes, Student Protests May Be Banned Altogether if Violence Continues, In-
dependent (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/student-pro 
tests-may-be-banned-altogether-if-violence-continues-2160620.html (describing Scotland Yard’s 
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In the case of Anonymous’ DDoS attacks, government crackdowns have 
already begun.214 Whether or not the courts or Parliament will recog-
nize these attacks as a protectable form of expression is yet to be seen.215 
 To the extent that an act of hacktivism is expressive, however, it 
should be eligible for protection as a form of legitimate protest.216 Cer-
tain forms of hacktivism—namely, virtual sit-ins and voluntary DDoS 
attacks—closely resemble traditionally accepted forms of protest, like 
physical sit-ins and picket lines.217 This is not to say that an act of hack-
tivism’s expressive nature, standing alone, should be sufficient to guar-
antee immunity. But, like forms of peaceful demonstration that have 
historically received presumptive protection, so too should acts of hack-
tivism that are primarily expressive receive protection.218 
2. Hacktivism, not Hijacking 
 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that some pri-
vate property owners are limited in their ability to exclude speakers 
from their property, it is far from clear whether it would tolerate the 
kind of hijacking of property that occurs through the use of some 
                                                                                                                      
proposal to request a ban on street marches if violence associated with ongoing protests does 
not subside). 
214 See Steve Ragan, Five Arrested in U.K. Raid on Anonymous, Tech Herald ( Jan. 27, 
2011), http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/201104/6749/Five-arrested-in-U-K-raid-
on-Anonymous (describing raids by the Metropolitan Police Service’s Police Central e-Crime 
Unit to arrest members of Anonymous for participating in DDoS attacks as part of Operation 
Payback). 
215 See id. (describing the discretion given to police to prohibit street demonstrations); 
supra text accompanying notes 179–189 (describing limited textual protection for free 
expression and discretion granted to courts and Parliament to restrict speech in favor of 
other interests). 
216 Cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (overturning conviction for violation 
of state flag desecration statute on First Amendment grounds). 
217 See Taylor, supra note 207 (“[T]he right to peacefully protest is one of the fundamen-
tal pillars of any democracy and should not be restricted in any way.”). Compare Duncan, supra 
note 67 (describing the popular use of LOIC and Hivemind software as part of voluntary 
DDoS attacks), with James Dickson, Ann Arbor Man Part of Sit-In at Sen. John McCain’s Tucson 
Office, Ann Arbor.com (May 17, 2010, 5:46 PM), http://www.annarbor.com/news/ann-
arbor-man-partakes-in-immigration-rights-sit-in-at-sen-john-mccains-tuscon-office/ (describing 
a sit-in at a U.S. senator’s office in protest of senator’s immigration policies, and noting sena-
tor’s acknowledgment of the protestors’ right to peacefully protest). 
218 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 546, 547 (1965) (overturning conviction for 
breach of the peace on the grounds that the State’s prohibition on certain conduct as a 
breach of the peace was unconstitutional); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 
(1963) (finding that arrest and conviction of peaceful protestors on charge of breaching 
the peace infringed the protestors’ First Amendment rights); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (articulating the principle that the First Amendment requires tolera-
tion of unpleasant and even insulting speech). 
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forms of hacktivism.219 Website defacements, for example, are unlikely 
to be protected, in part because they involve hacking into web servers 
and replacing the owners’ content.220 Moreover, lower courts have in-
terpreted the CFAA to prohibit the hijacking of third-party computers, 
by a bot or by other means, in order to access a website; thus, even vol-
untary DDoS attacks could be considered violations of the statute.221 
And it should go without saying that acts like information theft will al-
most invariably be condemned under any statute.222 The same is true of 
acts that are undertaken with a view to obtaining commercial or finan-
cial advantage.223 
 Likewise, British courts are unlikely to look favorably on methods 
of hacktivism that seize control of computers and other electronic de-
vices either to steal data or to use the devices for some other pur-
pose.224 Because certain species of hacktivism do not entail the hijack-
ing of third-party systems and are performed without the motive of 
commercial or financial gain, these forms should not be grouped with 
those actions that are properly prohibited under the CFAA and the 
CMA.225 Thus, primarily expressive forms of hacktivism that do not in-
volve involuntary or unauthorized access and control, like virtual sit-ins 
                                                                                                                      
219 Cf. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 79 (1980) (affirming state su-
preme court decision upholding state constitutional amendment protecting speech in 
privately owned shopping centers, and thereby preventing property owners from exclud-
ing certain speakers); Randall Bezanson & Andrew Finkelman, Trespassory Art, 43 U. Mich. 
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220 See, e.g., United States v. Dierking, No. 08cr3366 JM, 2009 WL 648922, at *1 (S.D. 
Cal. Mar. 9, 2009) (detailing ongoing prosecution of individual for violation of CFAA in 
connection with site defacements). 
221 See, e.g., Binary Semantics Ltd. v. Minitab, Inc., No. 4:07-CV-1750, 2008 WL 763575, 
at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2008) (finding that the use of a third-party’s computer to access a 
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222 See, e.g., SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that, although it is 
unclear that exploiting a weakness in computer code to gain unauthorized access to in-
formation is “deceptive” under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it is entirely possible that 
computer hacking could be prohibited under the statute). 
223 See S. Rep. No. 104-357, at 2 (1996) (amending the CFAA to prohibit specifically 
violations undertaken for commercial or financial advantage). 
224 See, e.g., James Robinson, Met Must Hand over News of the World Phone-Hacking Evi-
dence, Guardian (U.K.) (Mar. 18, 2011), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/ 
2011/mar/18/met-news-world-hacking-evidence (describing court decision ordering dis-
closure of evidence gathered in phone-hacking prosecution to plaintiffs in a related civil 
action). 
225 Cf. Samuel, supra note 25, at 8–10, 12–13. 
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and voluntary DDoS attacks, should be eligible for protection as legiti-
mate means of protest.226 
3. Hacktivism Without Harm 
 There is little to commend speech that leaves in its wake material 
destruction and physical injury.227 In the context of hacktivism, permis-
sible forms of protest likely to result in actual damage are more readily 
categorized as conduct rather than expression.228 Indeed, methods like 
site redirects, involuntary DDoS attacks, information theft and virtual 
sabotage229 all feature as primary components actions that are both nec-
essary to the method and unambiguously criminal.230 What is more, the 
actions in question—namely, hacking computers, web servers, and net-
works—are largely distinguishable from speech.231 These forms of 
hacktivism may be undertaken with a view to expressing some message, 
but the means involved forfeit any claim for protection.232 
                                                                                                                      
226 Cf. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310 (articulating the First Amendment’s requirement that 
unpleasant and even insulting speech be tolerated); Edwards, 372 U.S. at 235 (finding that 
arrest and conviction of peaceful protestors on charge of breaching the peace infringed 
the protestors’ First Amendment rights); Cox, 379 U.S. at 545 (overturning conviction for 
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227 See, e.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) (“It is one thing to say that the 
police cannot be used as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and an-
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New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (“It has been well observed that such utterances 
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guarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question 
under that instrument.”). 
228 See, e.g., Samuel, supra note 25, at 8–12 (describing forms of hacktivism like site de-
facements, site redirects, involuntary DoS attacks, information theft, and virtual sabotage 
that more closely resemble conduct rather than expression). 
229 See id. at 11–12. 
230 See id. at 10–11. 
231 See id. 8–11. 
232 Cf. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (noting the distinction between pro-
scribable intimidation and “core political speech” in the context of prosecution under 
state cross burning statute); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (per curiam) 
(describing the act of fashioning a peace sign to an American flag as an act of communica-
tion protected by the First Amendment); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 
(1968) (“[W]hen ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of 
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech ele-
ment can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”). 
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 Like the difference between a legitimate protest and a riot, per-
missible forms of hacktivism should have as their primary purpose the 
nonviolent communication of a coherent message.233 In fact, those 
forms of hacktivism that do pose a threat of physical damage or vio-
lence—that is, virtual sabotage and other malicious activity—are better 
described as cybercrime or cyberterrorism.234 Forms of hacktivism that 
cause significant monetary harm—as a result of information theft or 
damage to servers caused by the installation of malware, for example— 
should likewise be differentiated from hacktivism, and are properly 
prohibited as cybercrime.235 
 It does not follow, however, that if any harm is caused by an act of 
hacktivism, the act should be considered criminal.236 It may be that 
some forms of permissible hacktivism, like virtual sit-ins and voluntary 
DDoS attacks, do impose some cost on the targets of the protest.237 In a 
recent example unrelated to WikiLeaks, a massive DDoS attack against 
a “non-English blog” on WordPress.com resulted in connectivity prob-
lems for other WordPress users.238 In another example, DDoS attacks 
on Twitter in 2009 caused the site to shut down for several hours, and 
rendered several of the service’s features unusable for some time 
thereafter.239 While these attacks were apparently targeted at individual 
                                                                                                                      
233 See Op-Ed., Tuition Hike Protests: London’s Riot vs. Long Beach’s “Protest Carnival,” L.A. 
Times (Nov. 11, 2010), http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla/2010/11/tuition-hike-protests-
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234 See Samuel, supra note 25, at 3, 26. 
235 See id. at 28–29. 
236 See id. 
237 See, e.g., John E. Dunn, WordPress Recovers from Huge DDoS Attack, TechWorld (Mar. 4, 
2011), http://news.techworld.com/security/3263628/wordpress-recovers-from-huge-ddos-
attack/ (describing large DDoS attack on WordPress that resulted in connectivity problems, 
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network); Juan Carlos Perez, Update: Twitter Still Struggling to Recover from DDoS Attack, Com-
puterworld (Aug. 7, 2009), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9136363/Update_ 
Twitter_still_struggling_to_recover_from_DDoS_attack (describing Twitter’s multi-day strug-
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source). 
238 See Dunn, supra note 237. 
239 See Eliot Van Buskirk, Denial-of-Service Attack Knocks Twitter Offline, Wired (Aug. 6, 
2009), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/08/twitter-apparently-down/; Perez, supra 
note 237. 
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users of both services, their effects had implications for millions of 
other users.240 The services themselves likely devoted significant time 
and resources to defending against and recovering from the attacks.241 
These unfortunate facts alone, however, do not justify criminalizing the 
attacks.242 
 Protests and demonstrations cause inconvenience, annoyance, and 
distraction; they can impede commerce and attract unwanted atten-
tion.243 Frequently, they burden the target of the protest and dominate 
the forum of the demonstration.244 But, with some exceptions, like the 
target of a lawful, peaceful demonstration in the physical world, the 
target of a permissible form of cyberprotest must generally tolerate the 
inconvenience caused by hacktivism.245 It is part of the price to be paid 
for the freedom of expression.246 
B. Protest Without Borders 
 The burden that must be borne at the site of a protest may be 
made more tolerable in light of the unique, transnational character of 
hacktivism.247 The World Wide Web spans countries and continents, 
                                                                                                                      
 
240 See Dunn, supra note 237; Van Buskirk, supra note 239. 
241 See Dunn, supra note 237; Van Buskirk, supra note 239. 
242 See PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at 87–88. 
243 See, e.g., Robert Mendick & Jason Lewis, Oxford Graduate Trying to Bring Chaos to Brit-
ain’s High Streets, Telegraph (U.K.) (Nov. 13, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
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of Egypt’s Revolution, Christian Sci. Monitor (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.csmonitor. com/ 
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and users are able to share information with a global audience with 
unprecedented speed. News of injustice in a previously unreachable 
locale can be broadcast around the world in an instant.248 Social media 
is credited as an important tool for information sharing and organiza-
tion in the ongoing political unrest in the Middle East.249 As a result, 
nonresidents are able to learn of, encourage, and participate in domes-
tic affairs to an extent not possible before the Internet revolution.250 
Using forms of hacktivism as a means of protest, nonresidents are also 
able to take collective action against injustice.251 
 The upshot is that organizations and governments that were once 
insulated from criticism by virtue of censorship, oppression, or physical 
distance are now fair game.252 In countries that restrict Internet access, 
motivated nonresidents can give voice to dissent that might otherwise 
go unheard.253 And where street protests are subject to vicious crack-
downs, hacktivism is a reasonably safe means of demonstrating against a 
regime.254 Hacktivism can also be a useful tool for communicating 
complaints against corporations, as Anonymous demonstrated with its 
attacks during the WikiLeaks episode.255 Given that many corporations 
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are multinational, hacktivism can allow people to register grievances 
with companies even if the corporate headquarters are located on an-
other continent.256 In other words, hacktivism offers a tool whereby the 
object of protest cannot avoid being targeted by virtue of its power or 
its location, or a people’s poverty or oppression.257 
Conclusion 
 As exemplified by Anonymous in the context of the WikiLeaks 
controversy and the uprisings in the Middle East, hacktivism is increas-
ingly becoming a popular form of protest against perceived injustice. 
The existing legal regimes at both the international and national levels 
establish very general categories of prohibited conduct, and courts 
have not yet squarely addressed the applicability of principles of free 
speech to laws regulating computer use. This Note has argued that in 
light of the importance of hacktivism as a legitimate form of protest, 
courts should interpret laws like the Computer Misuse Act and the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act with the expressive function of hacktiv-
ism in mind. In addition, the potential for hacktivism as a transnational 
tool of protest justifies the marginal burden it imposes in its permissible 
forms. Although most current forms of hacktivism are rightly regulated 
or prohibited outright, a narrow subset of hacktivism should be pro-
tected on the grounds that it is primarily expressive, does not involve 
the hijacking of computers or networks, and causes no significant dam-
age. 
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